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CASE SUMMARY 
GEBHART v. GAUGHAN:  
CLARIFYING THE HOMESTEAD 
EXEMPTION AS TO POST-PETITION 
APPRECIATION 
INTRODUCTION 
 Filing for bankruptcy is becoming increasingly popular for 
debtors looking for a “fresh start” in their financial affairs.  In fact, the 
Administrative Office of the Courts reported over a million Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petitions filed in the 2010 fiscal year, up nearly sixteen 
percent from the 2009 fiscal year.1  Chapter 7 bankruptcy, commonly 
known as “liquidation” bankruptcy, is a powerful remedy for an 
individual debtor because it releases the debtor from personal liability for 
certain debts and prohibits creditors from taking action to collect 
dischargeable debts.2 
A bankruptcy case is commenced on the date the debtor files his or 
her petition.3  Among other things, the debtor must include in the 
petition a list of his or her assets, debts, and the specific exemptions 
being claimed.4  Once the petition is filed, all of the debtor’s legal and 
 1 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Up Nearly 14 Percent over 
Last Fiscal Year, U.S. COURTS (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/10-11-
08/Bankruptcy_Filings_Up_Nearly_14_Percent_over_Last_Fiscal_Year.aspx?CntPageID=1 
(“Chapter 7 filings in FY 2010 totaled 1,146,511, up 15.9 percent from the 989,227 chapter 7 filings 
in FY 2009.”). 
 2 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. 
COURTS http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
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equitable property interests become property of the bankruptcy estate.5  
To oversee the administrative process, the court appoints a trustee to 
serve as a representative of the bankruptcy estate.6  Section 704 of the 
Bankruptcy Code lays out the duties of the trustee, which include 
investigating the financial affairs of the debtor and reducing the property 
of the estate to cash in order to distribute the proceeds to creditors.7 
Although most of a debtor’s property belongs to the bankruptcy 
estate, the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to keep certain “exempt 
property” pursuant to section 522.8  Under section 522, the debtor 
generally will have the option to choose between the federal bankruptcy 
scheme of exemptions or state-law exemptions of the state in which the 
debtor is domiciled.9  However, each state has the choice to opt out of 
federal bankruptcy exemptions, causing the debtor to be reliant solely on 
the exemptions provided by the state.10  Unless a party in interest such as 
a creditor or trustee objects to an exemption claimed by the debtor, the 
property is deemed exempt.11  Pursuant to the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 4003(b), a trustee ordinarily has only 30 
days after the meeting of creditors to contest a claimed exemption or the 
right to include the exempt property in the bankruptcy estate is lost.12  
This is true even in an instance “where the debtor has no colorable basis 
for claiming the exemption.”13  However, in the United States Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Schwab v. Reilly, the Court held that a 
trustee’s failure to object did not prevent the trustee from forcing a sale 
of property that was worth more than the claimed exemption amount.14 
Nevertheless, Reilly left open the question whether a debtor should 
be allowed to retain any post-petition increase in the fair market value of 
the debtor’s residence if the debtor’s equity interest in the property at the 
time of filing was below the allowable exemption amount.15  Recently, 
the Ninth Circuit addressed this very issue in Gebhart v. Gaughan, a case 
 5 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
 6 11 U.S.C.A. § 323(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 7 11 U.S.C.A § 704(a) (Westlaw 2011); 13A-CS23 COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
FORMS § CS23.21. 
 8 11 U.S.C.A § 522 (Westlaw 2011). 
 9 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (Westlaw 2011). 
 10 Klein v. Chappell (In re Chappell), 373 B.R. 73, 77 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (citing 11 
U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)). 
 11 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(l) (Westlaw 2011). 
 12 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). 
 13 Chappell, 373 B.R. at 77 (citing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992)). 
 14 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). 
 15 Id. at 2668 n.21 
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that involved consolidated appeals.16  In Gebhart, the value of the 
debtors’ equity interest in their homes at the time of filing of each case 
was less than the amount allowed under the homestead exemption.17  
However, in each case the value of the property increased substantially 
after the date the petition was filed.18  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held 
that since the particular homestead exemptions involved in Gebhart 
exempted only specific dollar amounts and not the entire properties, each 
trustee was entitled to force a sale of the homestead property to collect 
the increased post-petition value in the property despite the trustee’s 
failure to object to the exemption within the 30-day time period 
prescribed by Rule 4003(b).19 
This case summary begins by discussing the facts and procedural 
history of the two consolidated appeals in Gebhart.  Next, it outlines and 
reviews the analysis of the Ninth Circuit.  Lastly, it concludes by briefly 
discussing the implications of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gebhart. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gebhart v. Gaughan was the result 
of consolidated appeals in two bankruptcy cases involving the question 
whether a trustee has a valid interest in the post-petition increases to a 
homestead property’s fair market value.20  While in the first case the 
debtor claimed a homestead exemption under Arizona’s statutory 
exemption laws, the second case applied the federal system of 
exemptions.21  In neither case did the trustee object to the claimed 
exemption amount filed by the debtor(s) within the 30-day time limit set 
by Rule 4003(b).22 
A. THE GEBHART BANKRUPTCY 
In an effort to obtain financial relief from his debts, Arizona 
resident Nikalous Gebhart filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on August 8, 
2003.23  In Schedule C24 of his bankruptcy petition, Gebhart claimed a 
 16 Gebhart v. Gaughan (In re Gebhart), 621 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 17 Id. at 1208. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id at 1210. 
 20 Id. at 1208. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 1208-09. 
 23 Id. at 1208. 
 24 In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, a debtor is required to include all the exemptions he or 
she is claiming under Schedule C of the petition. 
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homestead exemption in the amount of $89,703 for his residence located 
in Phoenix, Arizona.25  This value was determined by the difference, as 
of the filing date, between the fair market value of the property 
($210,000) and the mortgages encumbering the property ($120, 297).26 
After receiving his discharge on December 12, 2003, Gebhart 
continued to live in his Phoenix home.27  Under the impression that his 
home was now exempt from the bankruptcy estate, Gebhart decided to 
refinance his home.28  The mortgage lender also believed that the 
property was free and clear of any claims by the trustee of the 
bankruptcy estate.29  However, almost three years after the discharge of 
Gebhart’s debts, the trustee asked the bankruptcy court for approval to 
sell Gebhart’s home to recover the excess equity in the property for the 
benefit of the creditors on the grounds that the property’s fair market 
value had substantially increased subsequent to Gebhart’s filing of the 
petition.30 
In his response, Gebhart asked the bankruptcy court to order the 
trustee to abandon the property, based on the theory that the property was 
now valueless to the bankruptcy estate.31  In asserting that the homestead 
property was valueless, Gebhart argued that for bankruptcy purposes, the 
fair market value of the property is locked in at the time the bankruptcy 
petition is filed.32  In holding for the trustee, the bankruptcy court 
allowed the trustee to force the sale of Gebhart’s residence.33  Gebhart 
appealed to the district court, which affirmed the ruling of the bankruptcy 
court.34  Gebhart then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.35 
B. THE CHAPPELL BANKRUPTCY 
On June 30, 2004 Steven and Julie Chappell filed a joint Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition in the state of Washington, which—unlike 
Arizona—allows debtors to use the federal exemption system.36  When a 
couple files a joint petition, they are allowed to double the amount of 
 25 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1208. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 1208-09. 
 32 Id. at 1209. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
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their exemptions.37  Thus, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), the 
Chappells claimed a homestead exemption in the amount of $21,511.25, 
which was the difference between the fair market value of the property 
($350,000) and the liens encumbering the property ($328,488.75).38 
Similar to Gebhart, the Chappells continued living in their home 
after receiving a bankruptcy discharge on October 21, 2004.39  However, 
during the two years following their discharge, the Chappells were 
unable to keep up with their mortgage payments and defaulted.40  The 
mortgage lender then sought relief from the automatic stay in an effort to 
foreclose on the property.41  In response, the trustee of the bankruptcy 
estate asked the court’s permission to sell the homestead property, as he 
believed the fair market value of the property had increased by $200,000 
from the date the petition was filed.42 
Ruling in favor of the Chappells, the bankruptcy court held that the 
homestead property was no longer in reach of the trustee, because it had 
been transferred entirely out of the bankruptcy estate at the time the 
Chappells claimed their exemption in the property, and the trustee had 
failed to object within the 30-day time period under Rule 4003(b).43  The 
bankruptcy court further held that the value of the exempt property was 
determined at the time the petition was filed, thus no value remained in 
the homestead property.44  The trustee subsequently appealed to the 
bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP), which reversed the bankruptcy 
court’s decision and held in favor of the trustee.45 The Chappells then 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and their appeal was consolidated with 
Gebhart’s appeal.46 
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit reviews a district court’s decision to affirm a 
bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo, and all factual findings 
by the bankruptcy court are reviewed for clear error.47  This same 
 37 Id.; 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(m) (Westlaw 2011) (providing that the value of an exemption 
“shall apply separately with respect to each debtor in a joint case”). 
 38 Klein v. Chappell (In re Chappell), 373 B.R. 73, 75 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). 
 39 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1209. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.; Chappell, 373 B.R. at 75. 
 43 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1209. 
 44 Chappell, 373 B.R. at 76. 
 45 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1209. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. (citing Abele v. Modern Fin. Plans Servs., Inc. (In re Cohen), 300 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th 
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standard of review is used by the Ninth Circuit when reviewing the 
BAP’s decision to reverse a bankruptcy court’s decision.48  To determine 
whether a trustee is allowed to force a sale of a debtor’s home on the 
basis that the property’s fair market value increased post-petition, the 
Ninth Circuit panel in Gebhart spent the majority of its analysis on the 
issue of whether a debtor’s entire homestead property is removed from 
the bankruptcy estate as the result of a trustee’s failure to object to a 
debtor’s claimed homestead exemption within the 30-day period 
prescribed by Rule 4003(b).49  The Ninth Circuit also addressed the issue 
of whether the value of the homestead property freezes, for bankruptcy 
purposes, at the time the debtor files the bankruptcy petition.50  While 
ruling for the trustees on both issues, the Ninth Circuit left open the 
possibility that estoppel may work as a potential remedy for debtors in 
future bankruptcy cases.51 
A. TRUSTEE’S FAILURE TO OBJECT DOES NOT REMOVE ENTIRE 
 PROPERTY FROM THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE 
Writing for the Ninth Circuit panel, Circuit Judge Tashima noted 
that the central issue was whether a bankruptcy trustee’s failure to timely 
object to a claimed homestead exemption effectively removes the entire 
property from the bankruptcy estate.52  Under Rule 4003(b), a 
bankruptcy trustee has 30 days after the meeting of creditors to object to 
a debtor’s claimed exemption.53  If an objection is not made within this 
time period, the trustee waives the right to object to the claimed 
exemption in the future.54 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the United States Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz that a trustee is barred from 
contesting the validity of a debtor’s claimed exemption after the 30-day 
time period has passed, even if the debtor has no good-faith claim to the 
Cir. 2002)). 
 48 Id. (citing Sigma Micro Corp v. Healthcentral.com (In re Healthcentral.com), 504 F.3d 
775, 783 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 49 Id. at 1209. 
 50 Id. at 1211. 
 51 Id. at 1212. 
 52 Id. at 1209. 
 53 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1) (providing “a party in interest may file an objection to the 
list of property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors 
held under § 341(a) is concluded or within 30 days after any amendment to the list or supplemental 
schedules is filed” unless court “extend[s] the time for filing objections”). 
 54 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1). 
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exemption.55  The court of appeals further noted several other cases that 
held that once a debtor’s property is deemed exempt, it is no longer 
included in the bankruptcy estate; rather, it revests in the debtor.56  The 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that this conclusion is supported by 
language in the Bankruptcy Code that characterizes exempt property as 
belonging to the debtor and thus outside of the bankruptcy estate.57  
However, the Ninth Circuit did not stop its analysis there; the court went 
on to discuss the recent holding of the United States Supreme Court in 
Schwab v. Reilly as it relates to the issue presented in Gebhart.58 
In Reilly, the Supreme Court clarified its ruling in Taylor by stating 
that the value of the debtor’s property interest in a claimed exemption is 
limited to the specific dollar amount allowable under that particular 
exemption.59  In summarizing the Supreme Court’s holding in Reilly, 
Judge Tashima stated that “[e]ven when a debtor claims an exemption in 
an amount that is equal to the full value of the property as stated in the 
petition and the trustee fails to object, the asset itself remains in the 
estate, at least if its value at the time of filing is in fact higher than the 
exemption amount.”60  Thus, all that is transferred out of the bankruptcy 
estate is the specific dollar value of the debtor’s claimed exemption, 
rather than the property itself.61 
Gebhart argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Reilly applied 
only to the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme and therefore was 
inapplicable to his case since Arizona is one of the states that have opted 
out of the federal bankruptcy exemption system.62  In making this 
argument, Gebhart relied on a 1983 case from the Arizona Court of 
Appeals that stated that Arizona’s homestead exemption allowed the 
debtor’s entire property to be removed from the bankruptcy estate, rather 
than the specific dollar value of the debtor’s claimed exemption at the 
time of filing.63  However, the Ninth Circuit immediately rejected 
Gebhart’s argument, noting that the case Gebhart had relied upon was 
“decided based on an earlier version of the Arizona homestead statute, 
which exempted ‘real property’ whereas the current version of the statute 
 55 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1209; see Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992). 
 56 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1210 (citing Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991); Smith v. 
Kennedy (In re Smith), 235 F.3d 472, 478 (9th Cir. 2000); Bell v. Bell (In re Bell), 225 F.3d 203, 
216 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 57 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1210; see 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
 58 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1210; Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). 
 59 Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652. 
 60 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1210 (citing Reilly, 130 S. Ct. at 2661-62, 2666). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 1210 n.5. 
 63 Id.; Evans v. Young, 661 P.2d 1148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 
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exempts an ‘interest in real property.’”64  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that since Arizona’s homestead exemption is similar to the 
federal exemption statute in that they both limit the specific dollar 
amount a debtor may claim under the homestead exemption, the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation in Reilly applies to all exemption statutes 
that provide a dollar-value limit, including Arizona’s homestead 
exemption.65 
The Ninth Circuit did recognize that the Supreme Court in Reilly 
left open the question whether an entire property can be transferred to the 
debtor when at the time of filing, the full fair market value of the 
property is equal to or lesser than the maximum dollar amount allowed 
for the exemption.66  However, the Ninth Circuit never reached this 
question since in Gebhart the value of the debtors’ claimed homestead 
exemptions did not represent the full value of their properties—and only 
their equity interests in the properties were claimed as exempt.67  Thus, 
this issue remains open. 
The Ninth Circuit identified the factual differences between Reilly 
and Gebhart, noting that in Reilly “the debtor underestimated the value 
of the exempt property at the time of filing,” while in Gebhart “the 
debtors accurately valued the equity interests in their homestead 
properties at the time of filing, but the fair market values of the 
properties increased subsequent to filing.”68 However, the court did not 
find the differences significant enough to change its analysis of the 
issue.69  Therefore, since the Supreme Court held in Reilly that the 
debtor’s interest in the property is limited to the dollar value of the 
claimed exemption, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “any additional 
value in the property remains the property of the estate, regardless of 
whether the extra value was present at the time of filing or whether the 
property increased in value after filing.”70  However, the court explained 
its interpretation of Reilly may be limited to circumstances where the fair 
market value of the property—and not just the debtor’s equity interest in 
the property—is greater than the maximum exemption amount a debtor is 
allowed to claim.71 
 64 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1210 n.5 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1101(A); other citation 
omitted). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 1210 n.4 (citing Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. at 2668 n.21). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 1211. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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B. FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY DOES NOT 
 “FREEZE” AT THE TIME THE BANKRUPTCY PETITION IS FILED 
The debtors argued that the trustees no longer had valid claims to 
their properties, since the fair market value of their properties had 
effectively been frozen at the time of filing the petitions, and any 
conclusion to the contrary would be inconsistent with section 522(a)(2) 
of the Bankruptcy Code.72  Section 522(a)(2) states that “‘value’ [of 
property sought to be exempt] means fair market value as of the date of 
the filing of the petition or, with respect to property that becomes 
property of the estate after such date, as of the date such property 
becomes property of the estate.”73  The Ninth Circuit rejected the 
debtors’ interpretation of section 522(a)(2), noting that it was 
inconsistent with prior Ninth Circuit decisions, which had interpreted the 
statute as freezing the value of the debtor’s claimed exemption at the date 
the petition is filed, rather than freezing the fair market value of the 
property.74 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted past cases that had held that 
the bankruptcy estate is entitled to post-petition increases in the value of 
property even when a portion of the property is otherwise exempt.75  
Here, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that even though the prior cases dealt 
with California’s scheme of exemptions, the holdings were applicable to 
the present case since the Supreme Court reaffirmed that these 
fundamental principles applied to all exemption statutes that limit the 
dollar value of property claimed as an exemption.76  Furthermore, the 
decisions of these past cases were based not only on state law, but also 
on section 541(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, which states that 
“[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of 
the estate” is included as property of the estate.77 
C. THEORY OF ESTOPPEL AS A POTENTIAL REMEDY 
As a final argument, Gebhart asserted that even if the property is 
deemed to be property of the bankruptcy estate, the trustee should be 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2)). 
 74 Id.; see Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F.2d 1316, 1320 n.9 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 75 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1211; see Alsberg v. Robertson (In re Alsberg), 68 F.3d 312, 314-15 
(9th Cir. 1995); see also Hyman, 967 F.2d at 1321; Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 940 F.2d 1317, 
1323 (9th Cir. 1991); Viet Vu v. Kendall (In re Viet Vu), 245 B.R. 644, 647-48 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2000). 
 76 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1211. 
 77 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6); see also Reed, 940 F.2d at 1323; Viet Vu, 245 B.R. at 649. 
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estopped from forcing a sale of the property since the Trustee 
deliberately left the bankruptcy case open longer than necessary.78  
However, the Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether 
estoppel might be available as a remedy in a bankruptcy proceeding, 
because in any event Gebhart would not have been able to establish the 
elements required for estoppel to apply.79  Thus, the Ninth Circuit left 
open the possibility that estoppel might be a potential remedy in future 
cases. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
In Gebhart, the debtors argued and the Ninth Circuit agreed that the 
decision will lead to uncertainty as to the status of exempt property, even 
when the bankruptcy trustee fails to object to a debtor’s exemption 
within the 30-day time period.80  In fact, Judge Tashima expressly stated 
that a “Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a 
homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not 
happen for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons 
the property.”81  Consequently, bankruptcy courts may see an increase in 
debtors seeking orders to compel trustees to abandon property, as that 
may be their only option to obtain certainty over the status of their 
exempt property.82 
Additionally, since Gebhart entitled the bankruptcy trustee to the 
post-petition increase in value of property that at the time of filing was 
fully exempt, a bankruptcy trustee may be more prone to keep cases open 
longer than necessary in the hope of acquiring additional assets for the 
benefit of creditors.  While the Ninth Circuit noted that “[a] trustee has a 
duty under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) to administer the case quickly and 
expeditiously,” in Gebhart the bankruptcy cases had remained open for 
two and three years subsequent to the debtors receiving discharge of their 
debts.83  Thus, as a result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gebhart, 
 78 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1212. 
 79 Id. (“The following four elements are required in order for estoppel to apply: ‘(1) The 
party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or 
must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter 
must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former’s conduct to his injury’” 
(quoting Bob’s Big Boy Family Rests. v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 80 Id. at 1211. 
 81 Id. at 1212. 
 82 A debtor may petition the bankruptcy court to “order the trustee to abandon any property 
of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the 
estate.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 554(b) (Westlaw 2011). 
 83 Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1212. 
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abuses by the bankruptcy trustee may be more common as there is now 
an incentive to keep bankruptcy cases open. 
CONCLUSION 
Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Reilly, the 
Ninth Circuit held in Gebhart that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee may 
force a sale of a debtor’s homestead property that at the time of the filing 
was fully exempt, in order to realize equity in the property’s increase in 
value above the debtor’s claimed exemptions.  It determined that a 
trustee’s failure to object to a debtor’s claimed exemption within the 30-
day time period prescribed under Rule 4003(b) only removes an 
“interest” in the property from the bankruptcy estate equivalent to the 
specific dollar value claimed by the debtor at the time of filing; therefore, 
the property itself remains in the bankruptcy estate.84  As a result of 
Gebhart, debtors will be unclear as to the status of their property until 
either the trustee abandons the property or the bankruptcy case is closed, 
which might not occur until several months or even years after the 
petition is filed.  Furthermore, in allowing the trustees to collect the post-
petition appreciation value in the debtors’ homestead properties, the 
Ninth Circuit provided bankruptcy trustees an incentive to keep cases 
open longer than necessary, in hopes of collecting additional money for 
the creditors. 
 
NATALIE R. BARKER* 
 
 84 Id. at 1210 n.4.  The court did not address “instances in which the full value of the 
property at the time of filing is in fact equal to or less than the monetary limit provided for by the 
relevant bankruptcy exemption . . . because the debtors here claimed as exempt only their equity 
interest in their properties . . ., not the full fair market value of their properties.”  Thus, the court “left 
open whether such a claim would entitle a debtor to the property itself as opposed to a payment 
equal to the property’s full value.” Id. 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California; 
B.A. Psychology & Social Behavior and Criminology Law & Society, 2005, University of California 
at Irvine, Irvine, California. 
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